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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
September 29, 1986 Conference
Summer List 11, Sheet 1

Cert to CAlO (Holloway, boyle,
Logan)

v.

~United

States, et al.

Federal/Civil

Timely

•, '

1.

SUMMARY:

The State of Utah challenges the CAlO's

decision that the United States holds title to land under Utah
Lake.
~

The State of Utah contends (1) that the evidence of Con-

gress' s intent in the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888 to reserve the land under navigable waters is inadequate to overcome

CFVSG-

.l

i
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the presumption that Utah acquired title to the land at statehood
under the Equal Footing Doctrine, and (2) that only a conveyance
of land under navigable water, and not merely a reservation or
withdrawal of the land by Congress, is necessary to deny a state
its entitlement to the land.
2.

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

/

The original thirteen

states own the lands underlying navigable waters within their
boundaries as the sovereign successors to the English throne.
Under a constitutional doctrine known as the "Equal Footing Doctrine," all subsequently admitted states enter the Union on an
equal footing with the original thirteen states and so they too
hold title to lands underlying navigable waters.
Lessee v. Hagan, 44

u.s. (3 How.) 212 (1845).

See Pollard's
Before a state

enters the Union, the United States holds the land under navigable waters in trust for the subsequently admitted states.

Once

the state enters the Union, however, these lands belong to the
newly admitted state, and the state's "title to lands underlying
navigable waters within its boundaries ~ conferred not by Congress but by the Constitution itself."
&

Gravel Co., 429

Oregon v. Corvallis Sand

u.s. 363, 374 (1977).

Congress has the power, however, to make conveyances of land
under navigable waters.

Because of the trust relationship, two

conditions must be satisfied in order for Congress to make such a
conveyance: 1)

the conveyance must be made before the state is

admitted to the Union, and 2)

the conveyance /

ust be made for

"some international duty or public exigency." Montana v. United
States, 450

u.s. 544, 552 (1981).

If such a pre-statehood con-
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veyance is made, the state will not gain title to the land upon
admission to the Union.

/

This case involves a dispute between the United States and
Utah over title to the land under Utah Lake, a navigable body of
water covering !§0 square miles.

Several years before the entry

of Utah into the Union, Congress passed the Sundry Appropriations
Act of 1988, 25 Stat. 505, 526-27, which authorized the United
States Geological Survey to select "sites for reservoirs and other hydraulic works for irrigation and the prevention of floods
and overflows."

More importantly for purposes of this case, the

Act also provided that the United States would reserve the sites
that might be so selected:
all the lands which may hereafter be designated or selected • • • for sites for reservoirs are from this time henceforth hereby
reserved from sale as the property of the
United States, and shall not be subject after
the passage of this act, to entry, settlement
or occupation until further provided by law.
25 stat • 52 7 •
The United States Geological Survey exercised its authority
under the Act and reserved the bed of Utah Lake as a reservoir
site in 1889.

The United States, however, never used the lake as

a reservoir site.

In 1896, Utah obtained statehood.

In 1976, the Bureau of Land Management issued oil and gas
leases on the lakebed.

This led Utah to file an action in DC for

declaratory judgment that the 1889 withdrawal of Utah Lake did
not deprive Utah of its title to the lakebed, to quiet title and
for confirmation of the State's title under the Submerged Lands
Act, 43 u.s.c.

§

1311.
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The DC granted the United States' motion for summary judgment and quieted title to the lakebed in the United States.

The

DC noted that the United States Geological Survey used language
in its correspondence and documents surrounding the 1889 withdrawal that expressly included the bed of Utah Lake, and the DC
found that the United States withdrew the bed of Utah Lake as
part of the 1889 reservoir site selection.
argument that

the Equal

In response to Petr's

Footing Doctrine passed title in the

lakebed to Utah when Utah gained statehood, the DC noted that the
Equal Footing Doctrine includes an exception for withdrawals made
"after acquiring the terri tory and before the creation of the
state' for the carrying out of 'public purposes appropriate to
the objects for which the territory was held.'" Petr. App. 39a40a (quoting United States v. Holt, 270

u.s. 49, 54-55 (1926).

Because the irrigation for the benefit of future settlers of the
West was such a purpose, the 1889 withdrawal was valid and Utah
did not gain title to the lakebed when he entered the Union.
The CAlO

affirmed.

The CAlO

began by noting that

"'[a]

court deciding a question of title to the bed of a navigable
water must ••• begin with a strong presumption against conveyance
by the United States • • • and must not infer such a conveyance
unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made
plain.'" Petr. App. 7a-8a (quoting Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 551-552 (1981).

According to the CAlO, therefore, the issue

on appeal was whether this presumption had been overcome "by some
'definitely declared' or 'plain' intent to withdraw the bed of
Utah Lake 'because of some international duty or public exigen-
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cy.'"

Petr. App. 9a (quoting Montana, 450

u.s.,

at 552).

Al-

though it recognized that the principles of the Equal Footing
Doctrine referred specifically only to pre-statehood conveyances,
the CAlO asserted that the same principles also apply to prestatehood reservations and withdrawals such as that in this case,
citing United States v. City of Anchorage, 437 F.2d 1081, 1084-85
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, 766-68
(9th Ci r. 1970).

The~AlO

concluded that the United States intended to select

the entire lakebed as part of the 1899 reservoir selection, and
that the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888 imposed no restriction
on the type of land that the United States Geological Survey
could select.

The CAlO thus rejected Petr' s argument that the

Act did not include authorization to select the beds of navigable
waters.

Finally,

the CAlO rejected Petr's argument that there

existed no "public exigency" justifying the withdrawal.

It be-

lieved that the purpose of irrigation for the benefit of future
settlers of the arid West was a public purpose motivated by a
public exigency.
statehood,

Thus, Utah did not gain title to the lakebed at

because a valid withdrawal was made by the United

States in 1889.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

PETITIONER'S CONTENTIONS
(1) Petr first contends that the DC and CAlO failed to apply
the standards and presumptions mandated by the Constitution's
Equal Footing Doctrine.

Although a pre-statehood conveyance can
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defeat a claim that a state has title in land under navigable
waters, this Court in Montana reconfirmed the principle that such
a conveyance must only be made for "some international duty or
public exigency," 450

u.s.,

at 552, and noted that such a convey-

ance must not be lightly inferred.

There is a "strong presump-

tion" against a conveyance of land under navigable waters and
Congress's intent to make such a conveyance must be "definitely
declared or otherwise made [very] plain,""in clear and especial
words," or the valid muniment of title must "in terms embrace[]
the land under the waters of the stream."
flects no such intent.

Id.

The 1888 Act re-

As even the CAlO notes, the Act is silent

on whether it authorized the reservation of land under navigable
waters.

A principal reason this Court upheld the State's title

in Montana was the fact that the Indian treaties that purportedly
conveyed the land in dispute was similarly silent ori whether it
included land under navigable waters.

Id., at 554.

Yet the CAlO

deprived Utah of title because of this silence in direct conflict
with this Court's approach in Montana.
(2) Petr further contends that the history of the Act also
establishes that Congress never intended it to authorize reservation of lands under navigable waters.

Such land is "sovereign

land" that was not subject to public selection, settlement or
entry under the public-land laws even before the 1888 Act.

The

Act, however, provides that the selected land "shall not be subject ••• to entry, settlement or occupation."

The Act was passed

in response to the activity of "land-grabbers" who used the land
laws to take control of the most valuable irrigable public lands

..
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and reservoir sites.

The Act remedied this problem by authoriz-

ing the United States Geological Survey to make appropriate withdrawals of irrigation and reservoir sites.

Because sovereign

lands were not subject to public sale even before 1888,

land

under navigable waters was not affected by "land grabbing", and
hence the Act does not address sovereign lands.
(3) Even if the Act authorized the reservation of sovereign
lands, however, Petr contends that Utah Lake's reservation cannot
be justified by a "public exigency."

The CAlO erred by requiring

only "[a] public purpose motivated by a public exigency."

This

is a substantial dilution of the true standard, which requires
proof of a "public exigency."
cient.

See Montana ·, 450

A "public purpose" is not suffi-

u.s., at 556.

No such public exigency

can be found in Congress's desire to facilitate irrigation.
gardless of who had title to the lakebed,

Re-

the lake would be

available for irrigation.
(4) Finally, Petr notes that "this Court has never allowed a
State's Equal

Footing entitlement to be denied except upon a

final conveyance of federal title •••• "

Petr. App. 19.

A feder-

al reservation or withdrawal of land -- without a conveyance
is not enough to defeat the Equal Footing entitlement.

This is

an important issue because federal withdrawals and reservations
are common.

Only compelling needs giving rise to a definitely

expressed final conveyance -- in which the federal government's
title is extinguished in its entirety, leaving nothing for the
state to

succeed to

state's entitlement.

should

be

the basis for

denying the
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AMICI CURIAE CONTENTIONS
Thirty states have filed an amici curiae brief in support
of Petr's application for a writ of certiorari.
elaborates

on Petr' s

fourth

contention that a

The Amici Brief
reservation --

without a conveyance to a third party -- is insufficient to deny
· a state's Equal Footing entitlement to title in lands below navigable waters.
( 1) The Amici note that this Court has never held or even
suggested that a federal withdrawal of lands under navigable waters will defeat a state's title to such lands.
v. California, 436

In United States

u.s. 32 (1978), this Court held that a federal

withdrawal of submerged lands, prior to the enactment of the Submerged Lands Act,

43

u.s.c.

§

1301,

title to those lands under the Act.

did not defeat a state's
The Submerged Lands Act was

enacted to extend the principles of the Equal Footing Doctrine to
submerged lands underlying the terri tor ial sea.

Surely, Amici

argue, if a pre-Submerged Lands Act withdrawal cannot defeat a
state's statutory title, a pre-statehood withdrawal cannot defeat
a state's constitutional sovereign title under the Equal Footing
Doctrine.
(2} The Amici urge that the distinction between a conveyance
to a third party and a federal withdrawal is a substantive distinction.

When the United States has conveyed the land under

navigable waters, both ownership and sovereignty are severed, and
no attributes of ownership remain to be transferred to the new
state.

In the case of a federal withdrawal, on the other hand,

the United States has not conveyed the lands to a third party,
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but instead has merely withdrawn the lands from the operation of
the public land laws.

The lands remain in federal hands and thus

remain subject to the constitutional trust in favor of future
states.

Cf California, 436

u.s., at 40 ("A reservation ••• thus

means no more than that the land is shifted from one federal use,
and perhaps from one federal managing agency, to another").
problem with

the

CAlO's

analysis

is

that it makes a

The

newly-

admitted state's title in these lands hinge on whether it was
admitted to statehood before or after a federal withdrawal.
(3) Finally, the amici urge that this issue is an important
one.

The issue involves not "substantive property law as such,

but rather with an issue substantially related to the constitutional sovereignty of the States."
v. Corvallis Sand

&

Amici Br. 10 (quoting Oregon

Gravel Co., 429

u.s. 363, 381 (1977)1_.

In

addition to the attempt to transfer interests in the bed of Utah
Lake to third parties, the United States' attempts to transfer
lands under navigable waters to third parties in reliance on prestatehood federal withdrawal are at issue in five cases pending
in Alaska and in United States v. Alaska (No. 84, Original), now
pending in this Court.
RESPONSE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
The SG filed a response that addresses most, but not all of
the contentions of Petr and Amici.
( 1)

The SG argues that the selection and reservation of

Utah Lake was for a "public purpose[] appropriate to the objects
for which the United States h[e]ld the Territory" and that the
United States responded to a "public exigency" in doing so.

The
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opening of the arid West to homesteading raised the danger that
settlers might claim lands more suitable to reservoirs and irrigation works, and the reservation of Utah Lake as a reservoir
lake was a response to the resulting public exigency.

Contrary

to Petr's App., the S.G. contends that the CAlO applied the principles contained in Montana.

The CAlO required a public exigency

and the CAlO 's application of settled principles to this cases
does not merit review by this Court.

Although the CAlO used the

phrase "a public purpose motivated by a public exigency,"

there

is no indication that the CAlO intended a departure from Montana.
In any event, a "public exigency" is not a constitutional requirement, but instead is a guide to Congressional intent.
Montana,

450

u.s., at 556.

Here the

intent

to

reserve

See
the

lakebed is clear because the United States expressly reserved the
Utah Lake bed.
(2)

In response to the contention that the 1888 Act did not

expressly authorize the reservation of the lakebed, the SG contends that no express reference is needed so long as Congress's
intent
plain.'"
270

to

include

sovereign

lands

is

"'otherwise made

very

Id., at 552 (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank,

u.s. 49, 55 (1926).

In this case, the Act was broad in its

coverage and expressly covered "all the lands" that might be designated as a reservoir site.

Moreover, Congress was made aware

of the reservation of the Utah Lake bed, but took no action to
repudiate this reservation.
(3)

Finally, the SG contends that the practical importance

of the ownership of the bed of Utah Lake is small because the
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leases issued by the the Bureau of Land Management are about to
expire and no drilling permits were ever issued for the production of oil and gas from the bed of the lake.
(4)

Unfortunately, the SG does not respond to the conten-

tion made briefly by Petr, and extensively by Amici, that the
reservation or withdrawal of land under navigable waters does not
--unlike a conveyance-- act to eliminate the state's Equal Footing Doctrine entitlement to the land.
4.

DISCUSSION:

{_(DC?

~ 4_i- ~~ ~t..

(a) Issues Involving the 1888 Act
Montana v. United States, 450
most recent exposition of

th~ual

u.s.

544 (1981) provides the

Footing Doctrine.

The issue

in Montana was whether the United States had conveyed ownership
of the riverbed of the Big Horn River to the Crow Indian Tribe by
treaties in 1851 and 1868.

--

not convey ownership.

The Court held that the treaties did

It emphasized that a conveyance of land

under navigable waters can only be inferred when Congress's intention is clear:
But because control over the property underlying navigable waters is so strongly identified with the sovereign power of government,
it will not be held that the United States
has conveyed such land except because of
"some international duty or public exigency."
A court deciding a question of title to the
bed of a navigable water must, therefore,
begin with a strong presumption against conveyance by the United States and. must not
infer such a conveyance · "unless the intention
was definitely declared or otherwise made
plain," or was rendered "in clear and especial words," or "unless the claim confirmed
in terms embraces the land under the waters
of the stream."
Id., at 552 (citations omitted).
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The Court in Montana concluded that the treaties failed to
overcome the presumption that the beds of navigable waters are
held in trust for newly admitted states because the treaties did
not expressly refer to the riverbed and there was also not an
intent

to

convey

such lands expressed

in

clear

and especial

words.

Although the Court recognized that it had found a convey-

ance of a riverbed in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397

u.s. 620

(1970), it viewed Choctaw Nation as "a singular exception" and
noted that an usual history of the treaties, and a promise to the
tribe that no part of the reservation would ever become a part of
a state, overcame the presumption in that case.
I
tana.

.

bel~eve

v"

that the CAlO's decision is inconsistent with Mon-

The CAlO concluded that the 1888 Act authorized the reser-

vation of lands below navigable waters because the Act provided
such broad reservation powers and imposed no restriction on the
United States Geological Survey's power to reserve lands.

Clear-

ly, this is inconsistent with Montana, in which this very silence
was taken as strong evidence of the lack of such an intent.

The

CAlO's approach actually creates a presumption that the Act denies the state title by inferring such a denial by silence.

Fur-

thermore, there is little else indicating an intent by Congress
to reserve sovereign lands.
vent "land grabbing,
public sale.

n

The intent of Congress was to pre-

and sovereign lands were not subject to

Thus, no purpose would have been served by reserv-

ing sovereign land.
I do not believe, however, that this issue merits plenary
review.

Although the CAlO is in error and failed to apply the
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Montana presumption, this issue is necessarily fact-bound.

What

is in dispute is whether the 1888 Act displays enough evidence of
a congressional intent to reserve sovereign lands to overcome the
Montana presumption.

The CAlO purported to apply the Montana

presumption, and its error seems to be in applying the presumption.

One factor, however, may support certiorari in this case.

The CAlO includes a large proportion of those states most affected by the Equal Footing Doctrine; thus, the CAlO's erroneous application of
Still,

the Montana

presumption could have some import.

given that the real dispute in this case is over Con-

gress's intent in passing the 1888 Act, a resolution of this case
is unlikely to add anything to Montana.

(b) Issue Raised by Amici
The issue emphasized in the Amici Brief -- that a withdrawal
or reservation by Congress cannot act to deny a state its entitlement to lands under navigable waters -- may well merit plenary
review.

Only the CA9 and the CAlO (in the instant case)

have

addressed this issue, and both have concluded that a reservation
or withdrawal has the same effect on the states' entitlement as a
conveyance.

See United States v. City of Anchorage, 437 F.2d

1081, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d
764, 766-68 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400

u.s.

967 (1970).

ther of these circuits give much analysis for their approach.

NeiIn

Alaska, for example, the CA9 merely asserted that "[b]eyond question, the [United States] had power, prior to Alaskan statehood,
to withhold, withdraw or convey the land and water for any valid
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purpose," 423 F.2d, at 766, and cited three cases that involved
conveyances, and not reservations or withdrawals.

Because of the

nature of the entitlement at stake, only recently admitted states
are likely to be affected by this issue.

Thus, only the CAlO and

CA9 are likely to ever address this issue.

I believe that plena-

ry review may be warranted because the approach taken by these
circuits seems to be in error.
This Court has never even suggested that a reservation or
withdrawal

of land will defeat a

under navigable waters.

state's entitlement to land

All of the cases to address the Equal

Footing Doctrine have involved conveyances.
States v. Utah, 283

u.s.

Indeed,

in United

64, 88 (1931), the Court concluded that

an Executive Order that withdrew lands from sale and settlement
did not "constitute a grant," and thus held that Utah held title
to the riverbed of the Colorado River.

Analytically, a reserva-

tion or withdrawal is quite different from a conveyance. In a
conveyance to a third party, the United States loses its title to
the land, and thus need no longer hold the land in trust for a
state.

The theory behind the exception to the Equal Footing Doc-

trine for land conveyed to a third party is that rights granted
to third parties by the United States are not eliminated by the
entry of a new state into the Union:
It is settled law in this country that lands
underlying navigable waters within a State
belong to a State in its sovereign capacity
• • • subject to the qualification that where
the United States, after acquiring the territory and before the creation of the State,
has granted rights in such lands by way of
performing
international
obligations,
or
effecting the use or improvement of the lands
for the purposes of commerce among the States
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and with foreign nations, or carrying out
other public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the territory was held, such
ri$hts are not cut off by the subsequent ere=
at1on of the State, but r ern a in unimpaired,
and the rights which otherwise would pass to
the State in virtue of its admission into the
Union are restricted or qualified accordingly.
United States v. Holt Bank, 270
plied).

u.s.

49, 55 (1926)

(emphasis sup-

By inference, the state obtains those rights still re-

tained by the United States at the time the state gains statehood.
A reservation or withdrawal,

however,

"means no more than

that the land is shifted from one federal use, and perhaps from
one federal managing agency, to another."

u.s.,

fornia, 436

at 40.

United States v. Cali-

In the case of the 1888 Act, reserva-

tion simply meant that the land was no longer subject to public
sale.

The difficulty of the approach taken by the two circuits

is that it fails to explain why this simple change in the federal
use to which the land is put can eliminate the trust obligation
of the federal government to the future states.
This issue has much more imp~ance than the specific application of Montana by the CAlO.

I withdrawals

Pre-statehood reservations and

by the federal government were common in the West,

and thus the title to several lakebeds and riverbeds may well be
at stake.

According to Amici, title to withdrawn land is now at

issue in several cases now pending in Alaska.
Unfortunately,

however,

the SG

response does not discuss ~

this issue, and nothing suggests whether this issue was raised by
Petr

!'

in the

courts

below.

Although

the CAlO

addresses

this

- 16 -

issue, it is not clear from the opinion whether this was in response to argument by Petr or simply raised by the Court sua
sponte.

Indeed, the Petr only discusses this issue briefly in

its application, see Petr. App. 19-20, and most of the arguments
on this issue are only elaborated by the Amici in a brief filed
after the SG filed his response.

Because of the SG's silence on

this issue, and the possibility that this issue was not raised in
the courts below, I recommend that Court call for a supplemental
response on this issue.

I recommend that the SG BE REQUESTED TO FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE.

There is a response.

August 1, 1986
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Justice Powell

From:

Ronald

to

~tl~~4(.__

4J

-

~-~

February 14, 1987

f 1-

No. 85-1772, State of Utah v. United

~~~

~~ ~ ~
States ~, ~
L--t...

~~,,

Cert to CAlO (Holloway (CJ), Doyle, Logan) ~... •••. f-~ ~
A4 c:::::;.. .,

Set for oral argument Monday March 23 (first case)

~~'
-~~~

~4-~ . .

-------------------------------------------------~-~~-;F~ r~
QUESTIONS

PRESENTED:

1.

Whether

States is sufficient to defeat a

a

reservati_ h

.... __ ·the. United

~~~~~

State's entitl m

J

~e

Equal Footing Doctrine to lands beneath navigable~ : s~ ~
2.

If

so,

whether

the reservations

a~rhz ed

of the Utah Lake.

-

by

the

LtJ

n r=:..

.c-

/~~Aq)f

Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888 defeat Utah's

-

~~
...

~im t ~ bed

~ ,..~

6--f'

~~Lk
~-

rt:1

- ~

\

2.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
a 150-square-mile freshwater lake in Utah.

-

came a State in 18 96,

it has believed it owned the ~.IZ.t!:.~~--~_

Jl

,,

bed of the lake under the Equal Footing doctrine.

Accordingly,

.tt.

5

~I

~
F'1 ~

it consistently has regulated use, management, and control of the
lake.

In 1976, the Federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) began

issuing oil

and gas leases for mineral

beneath the lake.

rested its title on the Sundry Appropriations Act

of~

BLM

That

statute provided funds

land.
Utah brought this suit seeking a declaration that it has
title to the lake.
~o

~~vt

the lake.

.- ~

.• ~ ' was

The de found that the United States had title

On appeal, CAlO affirmed.

authorized

by

the

Sundry

~C Y-

CAlO noted that the Sur-

Appropriations Act

of 1888.

There was no exception on the face of that act for land beneath
navigable waters.
of the lake,

Because the terms of the Act covered the bed

the reservation was effective to prevent the land

from passing to Utah when Utah became a State.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR expressed particular
case,
'--

interest

in the S t)'C y

because it presents a fact situation quite common in the J...H..~!-

---------

Western part of the country.

t

After relisting the case, she voted

3.

to grant, and was joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE - BLACKMUN,

5'

yourself, and JUSTICE SCALIA.
II.
When this

!.rt'k:.J,

li:> ~~

BACKGROUND

country was formed,

the 13

original

states

succeeded to England's sovereign interests in land, which includ/3~~

ed ownership of all navigable waters and the
t

Under

this Court's equal
doctrine,
_________.....____.footing
......-,......,.
....

states

also

boundaries.
(1842).

receive

title

to

la~ds

beneath them.

subsequently formed

such lands located within their

See Mar tin v. Waddell,

16 Pet.

(41

u.s.)

367, 410

Thus, even if Congress does not speak to the matter, the

United States'

title to such lands passes from the United States

~
~~--

1-d

to the State immediately upon the State's entry into the Union.

~~~~

Like many other judicial doctrines, this rule rests on the impor-

'~

tant place of the States in our federal system:
To give to the United States the right to transfer to a
citizen the title to the shores and the soils under the
navigable waters, would be placing in their hands a
weapon which might be wielded greatly to the injury of
State sovereignty, and deprive the States of the power
to exercise a numerous and important class of pol ice
powers. But in the hands of the States this power can
never be used so as to affect the exercise of any national right --of eminent domain or jurisdiction with
which the United States have been invested by the Constitution.
For [state sovereignty is] but municipal
power, subject to the Constitution of the United
States, 'and the laws which shall be made in pursuance
thereof.'" Pollard's Lesseev. Hagan, 44 u.s. (3 How.)
212, 230 (1845).
On several occasions,

the Court has attempted to formu-

late the circumstances under which a State's equal footing claim
-hr H.-.-~
might be defeated. The most recent formulation provides
"'\

"that Congress may sometimes convey lands below the
high-water mark of a navigable water, '[and so defeat

_..

~

I

.J

\~

4.

the title of a new State,] in order to perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of
such lands for 'the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States, or J:o c ~ other public purposes appropr iate to the objects for Which tn e ~n1€ed ~ates hold the
Territory.' Shively v. Bowlby, 152 u.s. 1, 48 {1894).
But because control over the property underlying nav igable waters is so strongly identified with the sovereign power of government, it will not be held that the
United States has conveyed such land except because of
some international duty or public exigency."
United
States v. Montana, 450 u.s. 544, 551-552 {1981) [brackets by Montana court] •
Although this formulation suggests a number of different
situations under which a State might lose, this Court has accepted claims in only two situations:

first, when the United States

never had title in the first place; and second, in
v.

Oklahoma, 397 U.S.

620

{1970).

Choc~aw

Nation

The Montana Court's explica-

tion of the bases for the Choctaw decision is instructive.

Basi-

cally, on three separate occasions, the United States had estab1 ished

reservations for the Choctaw.

But each time the United

States subsequently breached its trust and took the land from the
Indians.

To secure the agreement of the Indians to a fourth set-

tlement,

the

treaty.

First,

government

inserted very

strong language

in

the

it conveyed the land to the Indians in fee sim-

ple,

rather than holding it in trust, the usual practice.

ond,

it pledged that

Sec-

"no Territory or State shall ever have a

right to pass laws for the government of the Choctaw Nation

.. .

and that no part of the 1 and granted to them shall ever be embraced

in any

Creek,

Sept.

Territory
27,

1830,

or
7

State."

Stat.

Treaty

333-334.

of

Dancing Rabbit

Presented with those

facts, the Court held that Oklahoma did not have title to navigable waters on the Choctaw reservation.

~

.

r .. • '

.

As the Montana court ex-

5.

plained, the history of that treaty was "unusual."

450 u.s., at

555, n. 5.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Can a Withdrawal or Reservation ever defeat an Equal Footing

Claim?
In this case,

the Court must decide whether a reserva-

tion or withdrawal by the United States can deprive a State of
its subsequent right to the 1 and under the Equal
trine.

Footing Doc-

Although the Court has never addressed the question,

I

think the tenor of the decisions and the pol icy concerns behind

----

the doctrine provide strong support for the State's position.

~

----------~~

--

the Court repeatedly h ;;-s stated that "[a]

court~

deciding a question of title to the bed of a navigable water must
begin with a

strong presumption in favor

of State title,"

.

--------~

Montana, 450 u.S., at 552. ~ the Court usually characterizes Congress' responsibility over such lands as fiduciary;
"the United States • • •

held

[tidelands]

1-uR,. qu-r-1-

e.g., ~ /.J ~4 ·-4

only in trust for

future States that might be erected out of that territory."

A:-1. ~~.t~
the ~~

Bo- :J~.

rax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 u.s. 10, 15 (1935).
Accordingly,

Utah argues that,

so long

as the United

States still retains ownership of the land at the time of Statehood, title passes to the State.

A mere reservation does not put

the land beyond reach of the Equal

Footing doctrine.

there is little specific support for
persuasive.
much less

First,

reserv ~

by the

this argument,

Although
I find it

federal ~ e...£_nm~ nt ~ of

"A reservation ••• means

/JI!...~ &..-

"'
·~~
V't.o-f~

no ~

more than that the land is shifted from one federal use, and per- ~ ~

6.

haps

from

one

federal

managing

States v. California, 436

u.s.

agency,

to

another."

32, 40 ( 197 8) •

United

Second, the Equal

Footing decisions uniformly describe the exception as covering
only "conveyances." E.g., Montana, 450 u.s., at 551. The reser......
"'
vations in this case were designed to remove land from the cate-

----

gory of public lands, susceptible to sale or homesteading, and to
reserve

those lands for

conveyance.

reservoirs.

This hardly

seems 1 ike a

Most importantly, the SG' s position would defeat the

purpose of the doctrine by allowing the United States to retain
title to such lands in itself.

The principal reason for the doc-

trine was the Court's belief that control over navigable waters
was an aspect of sovereignty held by States, not by the National
government.
230 ( 1845)

See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 4 4
(quoted supra, at 3).

u.s. (3

If the National government r e-

decide at any time to sell the lands to another, or to authorize
the nav iga tiona!

uses to which the State would put the land.
parent in this case,

or

~~
~

k-d..a.-,.
~

How.) 212,

tains lands for some public purpose, with title in itself, it can

activities that would destroy

~

recreational

This danger is ap-

~

~~

~
~

1-dr-

2.,' <

in which the United States wishes to sell

oil leases in Utah Lake.

It may be that Utah would do the same,

but that decision should be for Utah,

unless the United States

clearly conveyed its interest before Utah became a State.
The SG implicitly acknowledges that the language of the
Court's cases requires a "conveyance" to escape the Equal Footing
doctrine.

He argues that a

~~

e:a-~-

"reservation" effectively is a con- ~,, i-

veyance from one portion of the federal government to another.
am not persuaded.

'S &-

I

The fact of the matter is that the federal

7.

government retains control of the land, and the plenary power to
return the land to the use it was before the reservation, or to
put it to some entirely different

use.

I

think these options

should be foreclosed by the Equal Footing doctrine.
In sum,

I

recommend that you adopt a per se rule.

realize you are not fond of such rules,

I

but it seems to me that

such a rule is necessary where the reasons for the rule are coincident with the rule's boundaries.
that

the

policies

behind

the

To my untutored eye, it seems

Equal

Footing doctrine would be

harmed whenever the federal government retained title in itself
to navigable waters.
ly

addressing

Of course, there is no case law specifical-

the question.

But

considering

the

breadth

the

Court's earlier decisions have given the doctrine, and your affinities for federalism concerns,

I think it would be difficult

for you to write an opinin reaching the opposite conclusion.
B.

The Reservation in this case
)

Even if you disagree with the conclusion I

reached in

subpart A--and conclude that, for purposes of the Equal Footing
doctrine,

reservations are conveyances--! still would recommend

that you vote to reverse the judgment of CAlO.

As I explained

above, this Court has indulged the strongest presumptions against
finding that--------------~----------------------------------the federal government has disposed of land in a way
that would defeat a State's

Although it may

be that Congress acquiesced in the disposal in this case, I doubt
that the evidence is sufficiently overwhelming to meet the burden
the Court has required in earlier cases.

~

8.

The SG quite persuasively demonstrates that the United
States would win this case under ordinary criteria of statutory
interpretation.

The language of the 1888
Act authorizes reserva_____.

tions for

lands," with no exception for

"all

Major Powell, who reserved Utah Lake,

sovereign lands.

also drafted the statute.

Congress was presented with documents advising it of the reservation of Utah Lake and did

~ot

object.

Finally, in 1890 Congress

ratified the reservations made under the 1888 Act.

The words of

~

the statute do offer some support for Utah's contention that Congress'

primary goal was public lands.

The last sentence of the

statute, which describes the effect of the reservation, provides
that the lands shall not be subject to "entry, settlement or occupation."
to "entry,

Sovereign lands, 1 ike the lakebed, were never subject
settlement or occupation."

But I doubt that the in-

ference to be drawn from this clause would normally be enough to
overcome the import of the preceding phrase

"all lands," which

suggests that any type of land could be reserved.
But this is not_ _a_ _normal
statutory interpretation case.
___
t~_

----------------------------------The Court has applied a much higher
standard to claims that some
congressional action has defeated a State's equal footing claim.
"A court • • • must not infer such a conveyance 'unless
the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made
plain,' United States v. Holt State Bank, [270 U.S.,]
at 55, or was rendered 'in clear and especial words,'
Martin v. Waddell, su~ra, at 411, or 'unless the claim
confirmed 1n terms ern races the land under the waters
of the stream,' Packer v. Bird, [137 U.S.,] at 672."
Montana v. United States, 4500. S., at 552.
In the past, the Court uniformly has rejected the federal govern-

....__,.

-------

ment's claims when "[t]here was nothing in this [Act] which even
approaches a

grant of

rights in lands underlying navigable wa-

.

'·.!

9.

ter s; nor anything evincing a purpose to depart from the established policy ••• of treating such lands as held for the benefit
of the future state."

Holt Bank, supra, at 58-59.

This case differs little from many other cases in which
the federal
neath

government has sought to assert title to lands be-

navigable

waters.

-

The

Iff!

statute

purports

A.-

to

cover

"all

lands," but does not explicitly allow reservations of lands beneath navigable waters.
claims,
Nation.

This Court uniformly has rejected such

except in the narrow circumstances evidenced in Choctaw
The circumstances here betray

no

such exigency.

Al-

though it no doubt was convenient to reserve Utah Lake as a reservoir,

the

record demonstrates that

the Lake's large surface

area made it ineffective as a reservoir.

There is no reason to

believe that the government's purpose in securing sites for reservoirs could not just as easily have been served without taking
lands beneath navigable waters.
interests,
dispose

of

Considering the important state

I do not think it would be fair to allow Congress to
such lands without

Congress did not do so here.
II I.

explicitly

stating

.

its

intent •

Thus, I think the State should win.
CONCLUSION

The equal footing doctrine reflects a longstanding belief by this Court that control of the lands beneath navigable
waters

,--------

is an important aspect

of

state

sovereignty.

Although

that conclusion might have been questioned initially, it seems so
deeply
states.

ingrained now

that

changes would be

unfair to Western

Applying the Court's ~--------------------------past decisions, and the policy con-

elusion on which the doctrine rests,

I believe strongly that the

10.

Court of Appeals erred.

First,

I think the Court's past deci-

sions suggest that only complete conveyances to third parties can
defeat a State's equal footing claim.

Second, the Court of Ap-

peals concluded that plain language was sufficient to cover sovereign lands.

I think the Court's prior decisions require ex-

pl ici t reference.
I

recommend that you vote to reverse the judgment of

CAlO.

.
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To:
From:
Re:

Justice Powell
Ronald
No. 85-1716, Utah State Lands v. United States
You asked for a brief memo outlining the statutes in this

case and summarizing your thinking on the ability of reservations
to defeat Equal Footing claims.

I.

Congressional Action

In 1878, Congress recognized that Utah Lake was navigable
and surveyed it.
In 1888, Congress passed the Sundry Appropriations Act,
authorizing the United States Geographical survey (USGS)
serve lands that would be suitable for reservoir sites.

to reThe Act

on its face did not mention the beds of navigable waters.
In 1890,

Congress repealed the authorization to reserve

sites for reservoirs.
already made.

In the same Act, it confirmed reservations

The Act on its face did not mention the beds of

navigable waters.

---------

~------------------------

--

Congress did have before it, however, the re.____,
port of the USGS, that included a specific designation of the bed
of Utah Lake, as well as the lands surrounding it.
In 1896, Congress passed the utah Statehood Act, that reserved to the United States lands previously reserved under other
.._

7-'

- - - -

laws, apparently including the sundry Appropriations Act of 1888.
Nothing on the face of the Act mentions the beds of navigable
waters.

II.

Reservations and Equal Footing

page 2.

1.

Congress has the power to retain title in itself to

the beds of navigable waters.

As JUSTICE S'l'EVENS pointed out,

surely the Constitution permits Congress to retain such lands for
important military purposes.
2.

But there

--

-

is nothing

inconsistent with an ordinary

reservat!,g n and a State's gaining title under the Equal Footing
Doctrine.
_____.,..

~

Cong ress' purpose in this case was to prevent settlers

around the Lake.

That could be done without disturbing Utah's

title to the bed of the lake.
3.

For Congress to retain title in this way--and thus to

discriminate between the States in the important area of state
sovereignty of the beds of navigable waters--the face of the relevant statute should include reference to both (i) a reservation
'

that includes in so many words the beds of navigable streams, and
-~

(ii)

a

reservation that

____.-

is specifically directed against Equal

Footing rights of any State subsequently to be created from the
territory in question.

I "'-"•

' ._.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1772

UTAH DIVISION OF STATE LANDS, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1987]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether title to the bed of Utah
Lake passed to the State of Utah under the equal footing doctrine upon Utah's admission to the Union in 1896.
I
A

The equal footing doctrine is deeply rooted in history, and
the proper application of the doctrine requires an understanding of its origins. Under English common law the English Crown held sovereign title to all lands underlying navigable waters. Because title to such land was important to the
sovereign's ability to control navigation, fishing and other
commercial activity on rivers and lakes, ownership of this
land was considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.
Title to such land was therefore vested in the sovereign for
the benefit of the whole people. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U. S. 1, 11-14 (1894). When the thirteen colonies became
independent from Great Britain, they claimed title to the
lands under navigable waters within their boundaries as the
sovereign successors to the English Crown. I d., at 15. Because all subsequently admitted States enter the Union on an
"equal footing" with the original thirteen States, they too
hold title to the land under navigable waters within their

85-1772-0PINION
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UTAH DIV. OF STATE LANDS v. UNITED STATES

boundaries upon entry into the Union. Pollard's Lessee v.
Hagan, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
In Pollard's Lessee this Court announced the principle that
the United States held the lands under navigable waters in
the Territories "in trust" for the future States that would be
created, and in dicta even suggested that the equal footing
doctrine absolutely prohibited the United States from taking
any steps to defeat the passing of title to land underneath
navigable waters to the States. I d., at 230. Half a century
later, however, the Court disavowed the dicta in Pollard's
Lessee, and held that the Federal Government had the
power, under the Property Clause, to convey such land to
third parties:
"By the Constitution, as is now settled, the United
States, having rightfully acquired the Territories, and
being the only government which can impose laws upon
them, have the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, Federal and state, over all the Territories, so long as they remain in territorial
condition ....
"We cannot doubt, therefore, that Congress has the
power to make grants of lands below high water mark of
navigable waters in any Territory of the United States,
whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands for the promotion and convenience of
the commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or to carry out other public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the -United States hold the
Territory." Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 48.
Thus, under the Constitution, the Federal Government could
defeat a prospective State's title to land under navigable waters by a pre-statehood conveyance of the land to a private
party for a public purpose appropriate to the Territory. The
Court further noted, however, that Congress had never undertaken by general land laws to dispose of land under navi-
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gable waters. Ibid. From this, the Court inferred a congressional policy (although not a constitutional obligation) to
grant away land under navigable waters only "in case of
some international duty or public exigency." I d., at 50.
The principles articulated in Shively have been applied a
number of times by this Court, and in each case we have consistently acknowledged congressional policy to dispose of sovereign lands only in the most unusual circumstances. In recognition of this policy, we do not lightly infer a congressional
intent to defeat a State's title to land under navigable waters:
"[T]he United States early adopted and constantly has
adhered to the policy of regarding lands under navigable
waters in acquired territory, while under its sole dominion, as held for the ultimate benefit of future States, and
so has refrained from making any disposal thereof, save
in exceptional instances when impelled to particular disposals by some international duty or public exigency. It
follows from this that disposals by the United States
during the territorial period are not lightly to be inferred, and should not be regarded as intended unless
the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made
very plain." United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
u. s. 49, 55 (1926).
We have stated that "[a] court deciding a question of title
to the bed of a navigable water must ... begin with a strong
presumption against conveyance by the United States, and
must not infer such a conveyance unless the intention was
definitely declared or otherwise made plain, or was rendered
in clear and especial words, or unless the claim confirmed in
terms embraces the land under the waters of the stream."
Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544, 552 (1981) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, in only a single
case-Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U. S. 620 (1970)have we concluded that Congress intended to grant sovereign
lands to a private party. The holding in Choctaw Nation,
moreover, rested on the unusual history behind the Indian
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treaties at issue in that case, and indispensable to the holding
was a promise to the Indian Tribe that no part of the reservation would become part of a state. Montana v. United
States, supra, at 555, n. 5. Choctaw Nation was thus literally a "singular exception", in which the result depended "on
very peculiar circumstances." Ibid.
B
Utah Lake is a navigable qody of freshwater covering 150
square miles. It is drained by the Jordan River, which flows
northward and empties into the Great Salt Lake. Several
years before the entry of Utah into the Union, "[t]he opening
of the arid lands to homesteading raised the specter that settlers might claim lands more suitable for reservoir sites or
other irrigation works, impeding future reclamation efforts."
California v. United States, 438 U. S. 645, 659 (1978). In
response, Congress passed the Sundry Appropriations Act of
1888 (1888 Act), which authorized the United States Geological Survey to select "sites for reservoirs and other hydraulic
works necessary for the storage and utilization of water for
irrigation and the prevention of floods and overflows." 25
Stat. 505, 526. The Act further provided that the United
States would reserve the sites that might be so selected:
"[A]ll the lands which may hereafter be designated or selected ... for sites for reservoirs, ditches or canals for
irrigation purposes and all the lands made susceptible of
irrigation by such reservoirs, ditches or canals are from
this time henceforth hereby reserved from sale as the
property of the United States, and shall not be subject
after the passage of this act, to entry, settlement or
occupation until further provided by law." 25 Stat., at
527.

On April 6, 1889, Major John Wesley Powell, the Director
of the United States Geological Survey, submitted a report to
the Secretary of the Interior stating that the "site of Utah
Lake in Utah County in the Territory of Utah is hereby se-
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lected as a reservoir site, together with all lands situate
within two statute miles of the border of said lake at high
water." App. 19. The Commissioner of the General Land
Office subsequently informed the Land Office at Salt Lake
City of the selection of "the site of Utah Lake" as "a reservoir
site" and instructed the Land Office "to refuse further entries
filing on the lands designated, in accordance with the [Sundry Appropriations] Act of October 2, 1888." I d., at 21.
The selection of Utah Lake as a reservoir was confirmed in
the official reports of the Geological Survey to Congress.
Because the 1888 Act reserved all the land that "may" be
designated, the 1888 Act haQ.~ctical effect of res_erving
all of the ublic lands in the
st from ublic settlement.
California v. United States, supra, at 659. Therefore, in
1890-in response to "a perfect storm of indignation from the
people of the West," ibid. (quoting 29 Gong. Rec. 1955
(1877) (statement of Gong. McRae))-Congress repe~d the
1888 Act in the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1890 (1890
Act), ch. 837, 26 Stat. 371. In repealing_lhe 1888 Act, however, Congress provided "that'reservoir sites heretofore located or se!eCteashall remain se egated ana reserveCITrom
entryl)F se ement as provided by the 888 ct . 26 Stat.
391. Six years later, on January 4, 1896, Utah entered the
Union. The Utah Enabling Act of July 16, 1894 provided
that Utah was "to be admitted into the Union on an equal
footing with the original states." 28 Stat. 107.
In 1976, the Bureau of Land Management of the United
States Department of the Interior issued oil and gas leases
for lands underlying Utah Lake. Viewing this as a violation
of its ownership and property rights to the bed of Utah Lake,
the State of Utah brought suit in the District Court for the
District of Utah seeking a declaratory judgment that it,
rather than the United States, had title to the lake bed.
Utah also sought an injunction against interference with its
alleged ownership and management rights. In its complaint,
Utah claimed that on January 4, 1896, by virtu~ of the State's

or
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admission into the Union on an equal footing with all other
states, the State of Utah became the owner of the bed of
Utah Lake. The United States, in turn, answered that title
to the lake bed remained in federal ownership by operation of
Major Powell's selection of the lake as a reservoir site in
1889. The District Court granted summary judgment for
the United States, holding that the United States held title to
the bed of Utah Lake. The District Court found that the
withdrawal of the bed of Utah Lake in 1889 pursuant to the
1888 Act defeated Utah's claim to title under the Equal Footing Doctrine. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1986), and
now reverse.
II
The State of Utah contends that only a conveyance to a
third party, and not merel a federal re~land, can
defeat a State's title to land under navigable waters upon
entry into the Union. Although this Court has always spoken in terms of a "conveyance" by the United States before
statehood, we have never decided whether Congress may defeat a State's claim to title by a federal reservation or withdrawal of land under navigable waters. In Shively, this
Court concluded that the only constitutional limitation on the
right to grant sovereign land is that such a grant must be for
a "public purpos[e] appropriate to the objects for which the
United States hold[s] the Territory." 152 U. S., at 48. In
the Court's view, the power to make such a grant arose out of
the Federal Government's power over Territories under the
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, which
provides:
"The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States .... " U. S. Constitution, Art IV, § 3, Cl. 2.
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The P~se grants Congress plenary power to
regulate and dispose of land within the Territories, and assuredly Congress also has the power to acquire land in aid of
other powers conferred on it by the Constitution. Under
Utah's view, however, while the United States could create a
reservoir site by granting title to Utah Lake to a private entity, the United States could not accomplish the same purpose by a means that would keep Utah Lake under federal
control. We need not decide that question today, however,
because even if a reservation of the bed of Utah Lake could
defeat Utah's claim, it was not accomplished on these facts.
Although arguably there is nothing in the Constitution to
prevent the Federal Government from defeating a State's
title to land under navigable waters by its own reservation
for a particular use, the strong presumption is against finding
an intent to defeat the State's title. In Shively and Holt
State Bank this Court observed that Congress "early adopted
and constantly has adhered" to a policy of holding land under
navigable waters "for the ultimate benefit of future States."
United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, at 55; Shively v.
Bowlby, supra, at 49--50. Congress, therefore, will defeat
a future State's entitlement to land under navigable waters
only "in exceptional instances," and in light of this policy,
whether faced with a reservation or a conveyance, we simply
cannot infer that Congress intended to defeat a future State's
title to land under navigable waters "unless the intention was
definitely declared or otherwise made very plain." United
States v. Holt State Bank, supra, at 55.
When Congress intends to convey land under navigable
waters to a private party, of necessity it must also intend to
defeat the future State's claim to the land. When Congress
reserves land for a particular purpose, however, it may not
also intend to defeat a future State's title to the land. The
land remains in federal control, and therefore may still be
held for the ultimate benefit of future states. Moreover,
even if the land u~der navigable water passes to the State,

85-1772-0PINION
8

UTAH DIV. OF STATE LANDS v. UNITED STATES

the federal government may still control, develop and use the
waters for its own purposes. Arizona v. California, 373
U. S. 546, 597-598 (1963). Congress, for example, may intend to create a reservoir, but also intend to let the State obtain title to the land underneath this reservoir upon entry
into Statehood. Such an intent would not be unusual. In
Montana v. United States, supra, we found that Congress intended to permit the State to take title to the bed of a navigable river even though the river was in the midst of an Indian
Reservation, and in United States v. Holt State Bank, supra,
we held that Congress intended the State to hold title to the
bed of a navigable lake wholly within the boundaries of an Indian Reservation.
Given the longstanding policy of holding land under naviga- ~
ble waters for the ultimate benefit of the States, therefore,
we would not 'ihfer an intenfto defeat a State's equal footing
entitlemeirt"fro;; the m~r-e-a-c7t -o-rrr'es_e_r_v_a_,I~o-n......,_s-e-n-.---r ssumin~do that a r servatwn o land could be effective to
overcome the strong presumption against the defeat of state
title, the United States would not merely be required to establish that Congress clearly intended to include land under
navigable waters within the federal reservation; the United
States would additionally have to establish that Congress affirmatively intended to defeat the future State's title to such
land.
III
We conclude that the 1888 Act fails to make sufficiently
plain either a congressional intent to include the bed of Utah
Lake within the reservation or an intent to defeat Utah's
claim to title under the equal footing doctrine. The 1888 Act
provided that the reserved lands were "reserved from sale as
the property of the United States, and shall not be subject
... to entry, settlement or occupation until further provided
by law." 25 Stat. 505, 527. The words of the 1888 Act did
not necessarily refer to lands under navigable waters because
lands under navigable lakes and rivers such as the bed of
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Utah Lake were already the property of the United States,
and were already exempt from sale, entry, settlement or
occupation under the general land laws. As this Court recognized in Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 48, "Congress has
never undertaken by general laws to dispose of" land under
navigable waters. See also Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153
U. S. 273, 284 (1894) (applying Shively v. Bowlby, supra, to
hold that "the general legislation of Congress in respect to
public lands does not extend to tide lands"); Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 437 (1892) (holding that
"the same doctrine as to the dominion and sovereignty over
and ownership of lands under navigable waters ... applies,
which obtains at the common law as to the dominion and sovereignty over and ownership of lands under under tide waters on the borders of the sea"). Therefore, little purpose
would have been served by the reservation of the bed of Utah
Lake. Moreover, the concerns with monopolization and
speculation that motivated Congress to enact the 1888 Act,
see P. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development 641
(1868), had nothing to do with the beds of navigable rivers
and lakes.
The intent to reach only land that would otherwise be
available for sale and settlement is made manifest by the
Act's proviso:
"Provided, That the President may at any time in his discretion by proclamation open any portion or all of the
lands reserved by this provision to settlement under the
homestead laws." 25 Stat., at 527.
This proviso would permit the President to open any land reserved under the 1888 Act to settlement under the homesteading laws. We find it inconceivable that Congress intended by this simple proviso to abandon its long-held and
unyielding policy of never permitting the sale or settlement
of land under navigable waters under the general land laws.
Shively v. Bowlby, supra, at 48. The proviso can be interpreted consistently with that policy only if lands under navi-
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gable waters were not subject to reservation under the 1888
Act in the first instance.
The United States, however, does not rely solely on the
1888 Act. It points to references to the bed of Utah Lake
made by the Geological Survey in reserving Utah Lake, and
contends that Congress ratified the Geological Survey's reservation of the bed of Utah Lake in the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1890. In the 1890 Act, Congress repealed the
1888 Act, but also specifically provided that "reservoir sites
heretofore located or selected shall remain segregated and
reserved from entry or settlement as provided by [the 1888]
Act, until otherwise provided by law." 26 Stat. 391. Thus,
the United States argues, Congress ratified the reservation
of the lake bed of Utah Lake.
At first examination, statements made by the Geological )
Survey in reserving Utah Lake might seem to support this
argument. The Tenth Annual Report of the Geological Survey, which was transmitted to Congress, stated that an individual had been sent to examine Utah Lake "with reference
to its capacity for a reservoir site," in order that he might
"furnish the specifications for its withdrawal as such under
the law, so far as the lands covered or overflowed by it or the
lands bordering upon it were still public lands." App. 25.
Furthermore, in the Eleventh Annual Report, the Geological
Survey reported that "the segregation" of Utah Lake "was
made to include not only the bed but the lowlands up to high
water." Id., at 29. The Geological Survey's references to
the "segregation" of the bed of Utah Lake, however, must be
placed in the proper context. A "segregation" of land simply
means that the land is no longer subject to disposal under the
public land laws. See E. Baynard, Public Land Law and
Procedure § 5.32 (1986). The bed of Utah Lake had already
been "segregated" by the United States Geological Survey
even before the adoption of the 1888 Act. The United States
had surveyed Utah Lake between 1856 and 1878, and hadestablished the "meander line"-the mean high-water eleva-

I
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tion-segregating the land covered by navigable waters from
land available for public sale and settlement. Record, Vol.
IV, tab F; United States Bureau of Land Management, Manual of Instructions for the Survey of the Public Lands of the
United States § 3-115, p. 93 (1973) ("All navigable bodies of
water and other important rivers and lakes are segregated
from the public lands at mean high-water elevation"). Given
that the bed of Utah Lake was already "segregated" from
public sale, the United States Geological Survey Reports are
best understood as reporting the further segregation of the
lands adjacent to the lake which, until the reservation of
Utah Lake in 1889, had not been segregated and thus had
been available for public settlement. In the Eleventh Annual Report, for example, the Geological Survey's announcement that "the segregation" of Utah Lake "includ[ed] not
only the bed but the lowlands up to mean high water" in our
view simply announced an increase in the segregated portion
of Utah Lake. App. 29. Because the bed of Utah Lake had
been segregated as early as 1878, the Geological Survey's
statement that the lake bed was segregated need not be
taken as a statement that the bed was included within the
reservation. Similarly, the Tenth Annual Report's statement that a Geological Survey employee would furnish specifications for a withdrawal "so far as the lands covered or
overflowed by [Utah Lake] or the lands bordering upon it
were still public lands," id., at 25 (emphasis supplied), is consistent with an intention that the Geological Survey would
withdraw those lands still subject to public settlement, i. e.,
the lands that were "still public lands." See E. Baynard,
supra, at § 1.1, p. 2 ("Most enduringly, the public lands have
been defined as those lands subject to sale or other disposal
under the general land laws") (emphasis in original). Because the bed of Utah Lake was not at that time "public land"
subject to settlement, we think it doubtful that the Tenth Annual Report should be understood as informing Congress that
the Geological Survey had reserved the bed of Utah Lake.
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The record reflects that the Geological Survey's concern in
1889 was not with the bed of Utah Lake; rather its concern
was that the land adjacent to the lake was then available for
public sale and settlement under the general land laws. In
Major Powell's letter to the Department of the Interior announcing the selection of Utah Lake as a reservoir site he did
not discuss the bed of Utah Lake. Instead, he observed that
"further entries of the lands adjoining Utah Lake will have a
tendency to defeat the purposes of [the 1888 Act] and obstruct the use of the lake as a natural reservoir," App. 20,
and that "speedy action" was necessary to avoid settlement.
Ibid. Thus, Major Powell recommended that "the Register
of the Land Office at Salt Lake City be instructed to refuse
entries of public land within" two miles of the lake. Ibid.
The local land office was so instructed by the Department of
the Interior. Id., at 21.
We further find no clear demonstration that Congress intended to ratify any reservation of the bed of Utah Lake in
the 1890 Act. At best, the United States points to only scattered references to the bed of Utah Lake in the material submitted to Congress, and presents no unambiguous evidence
that members of Congress actually understood these references as pointing to a reservation of the bed of Utah Lake.
As with the 1888 Act, the language of the 1890 Act is consistent with the view that only land available for entry and sale
was reserved:
"reservoir sites heretofore located or selected shall remain segregated and reserved from entry or settlement
as provided by said act, until otherwise provided by
law .... " 26 Stat. 371, 391.
In sum, the 1890 Act can be understood as ratifying a reservation of the bed of Utah Lake only by ignoring the language of the 1890 Act and by taking the Geological Survey's
references to the bed of Utah Lake out of context. Under
our precedents, however, we cannot so lightly infer the reservation of land under navigable waters. We conclude,

85-1772-0PINION
UTAH DIV. OF STATE LANDS v. UNITED STATES

13

therefore, that the 1890 Act no more "definitely declared or
otherwise made plain" Congress' intention to reserve Utah
Lake than had the 1888 Act. Montana v. United States,
supra, at 552 (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank,
supra, at 55).
IV
Even if Congress did intend to reserve the bed of Utah
Lake in either the 1888 Act or the 1890 Act, however, <Congress did not clearly express an intention to defeat Utah's
claim to the lake e un er the equal footin doctrine upon
entry into statehood. T e nited States points to no evidence of a congressional intent to defeat Utah's entitlement
to the bed of Utah Lake, and the structure and the history of
the 1888 Act strongly suggest that Congress had no such intention. On.its face, the 1888 Act does not purport to defeat
the entitlement of future states to any land reserved. Instead, the Act merely provides that any reserved land is "reserved from sale" and "shall not be subject ... to entry, settlement or occupation;" it makes no mention of the States'
entitlement to the beds of navigable rivers and lakes upon
entry into statehood. The transfer of title of the bed of Utah
Lake to Utah, moreover, would not prevent the federal government from subsequently developing a reservoir or water
reclamation project at the lake in any event. See, e. g., Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 451-452 (1931) (holding
that the United States has power to construct a dam and reservoir on a navigable river).
Finally, the broad sweep of the 1888 Act cannot be reconciled with an intent to defeat the States' title to the land
under navigable waters. As noted above, the 1888 Act "had
the practical effect of reserving all of the public lands in the
West from settlement." California v. United States, supra,
at 659. In light of the congressional policy of defeating the
future states' title to the lands under navigable waters only
"in exceptional instances" in case of "international duty or
public exigency," United States v. Holt State Bank, supra, at

J
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55, we find it inconceivable that Congress intended to defeat
the future states' title to all such land in the western United
States. Such an action would be wholly at odds with Congress' policy of holding this land for the ultimate benefit of
the future states.
In sum, Congress did not definitely declare or otherwise
make very plain either its intention to reserve the bed of
Utah Lake or to defeat Utah's title to the bed under the
Equal Footing Doctrine. Accordingly, we hold that the bed
of Utah Lakes passed to Utah upon that state's entry into
statehood on January 4, 1896. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is
Reversed.
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